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THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS OF THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE LAW 
Richard A. Epstein
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GREAT DISCONNECT 
The theme of this lecture is one that is not likely, on first ap-
pearance, to garner much support from experts in constitutional law, 
for in it I shall defend the thesis that takings law, and indeed any oth-
er issue relating to individual rights, will never be rightly decided so 
long as the Supreme Court continues to apply its current intellectual 
approach that disregards the common law foundations on which any 
sound theory of constitutional law should rest.  Yet, unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court treats its takings jurisdiction as if it were con-
tained in a sealed container, whose key premises are matters of public 
law, to be decided by Justices who have often only a passing 
knowledge of the private law concepts on which I believe all public 
law deliberations must ultimately rest.  This disconnect between the 
public and private law dooms the former to intellectual incoherence 
because of its disregard of the latter. 
I make this claim, in large measure, because of my own edu-
cation and exposure to the field.  In a teaching career that is now in 
its forty-sixth year, I have taught only two courses in constitutional 
law proper, neither of which was concerned with the takings issue.  
My exposure to this field comes from having taught a full range of 
common law courses in property, contracts and torts, which has then 
been backstopped by teaching courses in land use planning and land 
finance, both of which centrally implicate constitutional issues on 
 
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, the Peter and 
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distin-
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This article is a much expanded and revised version of the lecture given at the Touro Law 
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takings. 
One result that comes from the constant exposure to these ma-
terials is a heightened respect for the ingenuity and internal coherence 
of the common law, or judge-created system of rights.  The law be-
gins with rules of acquisition, and then, in the case of land (but not 
water), defines property as the exclusive right to the possession, use 
and disposition of some piece of land from the center of the earth to 
the tops of the heavens.  It then specifies ways in which that property 
can be protected from actions by others that either take the property 
or damage it.  It also develops rules that allow for the orderly transfer 
of property, in either whole or in part, to one or more individuals, of-
ten simultaneously.  The full articulation of the system permits an ef-
ficient deployment of these assets, because while the common law 
takes care to protect property from external aggression, it takes equal 
care to see that property owners are not shielded from competition 
from other persons operating on their own property with their own 
assets.  The system of the bundle of property rights has often been at-
tacked within the realist tradition as a random assemblage of sticks, 
thrown together without any real internal coherence.1  But, the oppo-
site is true.  Keeping to these rules creates a private property system 
that, by and large, leads to efficient resource decisions and, critically, 
paves the way for a set of intelligent corrections, such as rules for re-
cordation, that can fill in the gaps left by the common law rules. 
There is little dispute, moreover, that any system of constitu-
tional law that paid full respect to these common law rights would of-
fer far greater protection to property than the current “ad hoc” set of 
rules championed by a Supreme Court that represents a complete dis-
connect from the integrative achievements of the common law.  Un-
fortunately, Supreme Court Justices of all political stripes, by and 
large, buy into the progressive proposition that this system of private 
property law imposes few, if any, constraints that bind either the 
states or the federal government in land use regulation.  The implicit 
 
1 For a discussion of that approach, see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Ex-
clude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 737 (1998).  For a discussion of the views of Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (discussing, in part, property rights).  Hohfeld 
never actually referred to that view.  Merrill, supra, at 737-38.  For a discussion of recent 
views on the bundle of rights language, see Intellectual Tyranny of the Status Quo Symposi-
um: Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 193 (2011), available at 
http://econjwatch.org/issues/volume-8-issue-3-september-2011 (follow “Download entire 
September 2011 issue (1.7 MB) (pdf)” hyperlink). 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 2, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/6
2014] COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS  267 
assumption behind much of this work is that all property rights de-
rive, not from initial occupation, but either expressly or impliedly 
from some state grant, so that what the state has given it may now 
take away by exercising these supposed reserved powers. 
In order to make good on these claims about the destructive 
impact of this disconnect, I consider first the coherence of any com-
mon law system of property rights and then its vulnerabilities.  I use 
the phrase “common law” with two modest qualifications.  First, I am 
referring to judge-made rules and, for these purposes, do not differen-
tiate between those rules on the common law side of the English 
Courts from those on the equity side.  Second, in dealing with these 
issues, I cover indifferently the common law and civil law systems, 
deriving as they do from the Roman law.  On points of detail and on 
matters of form, these systems differ from each other.  But, on the 
basic structural issue raised here, the differences do not loom large 
against the overwhelming similarities that start from the fact that both 
systems rely on some version of the first possession rule for land and 
switch gears, at least in riparian states, to common ownership for wa-
ter.  The details on conveyancing, or between usufructs and life es-
tates or in the choice of certain remedies, raise in virtually all cases 
second order questions that I do not cover here. 
In sum, it is both dangerous and unwise to think of property 
as some arbitrary assemblage of rights that could be accepted or dis-
regarded with impunity.  The internal coherence and the huge institu-
tional success of the basic system of property rights rests on perma-
nent, not transient, features of the natural resources and on the need 
to channel the efforts of self-interested individuals into productive 
channels.  The close convergence between Roman and common law 
systems of property rights on these key essentials is no accident, nor 
is it solely a function of cross cultural pollination.  In large measure, 
it is because these basic features fit together into a comprehensive 
whole.  The key properties of land and water are “natural” in the 
strongest sense of that term.  They are defined by the properties of 
these natural resources—land stays still, water moves—that derive 
from physics and, thus, shape human interactions long before the 
formation of the state or of any human system of legal entitlements. 
II. THE COHERENCE OF THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM 
The historical system of property rights, both in common and 
3
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Roman law, takes a very different view.  They both start with the 
proposition that, in a state of nature, property is a res nullius, a thing 
owned by no one that is acquired in fee simple by the first occupant 
of that property.2  Property rights, thus, start from the bottom up, and 
the role of the state is to afford those rights so acquired with its pro-
tection, for which it is entitled to exact the taxes needed through its 
exercise of the police power to implement that system of property 
protection.  These rules of first possession are resource specific.  In-
deed, from the earliest times, the basic riparian system of water rights 
reached the opposite conclusion.3  No individual could unilaterally 
occupy or divert a stream or a lake.  These rights were held in com-
mon for all members of a community to use, but none to expropriate 
for himself.  The exact division of these common rights was very 
complex.  In some instances, only riparians could remove water from 
the river.  But with respect to recreation and transportation, nonripar-
ians had access and use rights as well. 
The source of the difference lies in a trade-off between two 
types of costs, those of exclusion and those of coordination.  With 
land, its ownership by a single person tends to facilitate its develop-
ment, so that ownership by occupation becomes the rule subject to 
limitations on use imposed through the law of nuisance that protects 
all neighbors from the excesses of each other.  With water, the “going 
concern” value of a river is preserved by preventing anyone from di-
verting it.  The basic proposition is to keep the river as a form of 
common property subject to limited rights of removal that provide 
private value without disrupting the overall river system.  For the 
most part, I shall consider cases with land, but as the issue of takings 
does arise in dramatic form in water rights cases as well, I shall con-
clude with an example of how the same disconnect has marred the 
Supreme Court’s taking jurisprudence insofar as it applies to water. 
Turning back to land, its rules on possession, use and disposi-
tion are intended to create an exhaustive system of rights in a single 
person that facilitates its efficient use, first by use and then by dispo-
sition, in which the original owner and any outsider are able to cap-
ture gains from trade.  Similarly, the decision to give ownership from 
the center of the earth to the top of the heavens is intended to make 
 
2 See, e.g., THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 82-83 (Francis De Zulueta trans., Oxford University 
Press 1946). 
3 See, e.g., THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 155-85 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., William 
S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1876). 
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sure that the law does not impose any artificial boundary between the 
owner of the surface and someone else, whether another person or the 
state.  The creation of that arbitrary line at common law could (at 
least until the advent of air travel, where adjustments are needed) on-
ly increase the complexity of land transactions without providing any 
offsetting social gain. 
Yet, if the legal system does not force these divisions on 
landowners, it allows their creation by voluntary arrangement, when 
explicit terms of the conveyance or lease could deal with these transi-
tional problems.  Accordingly, a robust set of property rules not only 
allows for the division of property over time—the split between a 
lease or a life estate on the one hand, and a reversion on the other.  It 
also allows for the division in space, so that the owner of the fee sim-
ple can sell off the air rights to another party for its use, which is 
what happened in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York.4  In like fashion, it also allows for the severance of mineral 
rights beneath the surface, which were implicated in the critical Su-
preme Court decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.5  In neither of 
these cases is it possible to create a “clean deal” because of the need 
of the parties to create easements that supply ground support and ac-
cess for the holders of both sets of rights, and similar rights of access 
and support for both the holder of the mineral and surface estates.  
But, it is only if the economic logic of these divided interests is fully 
understood that it is possible to understand how their government 
regulation should take place under the Takings Clause. 
This brief discussion establishes that the right to exclude is a 
key portion of any system of land rights.  Thus, as Justice Rehnquist 
wrote in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,6 “[i]n this case, we hold that 
the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental ele-
ment of the property right, falls within this category of interests that 
the Government cannot take without compensation.”7 
 
4 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
5 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
6 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
7 Id. at 179-80.  The quoted words have been quoted in numerous subsequent decisions 
that do not involve any of the transitional complications found in Kaiser Aetna.  See, e.g., 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1044  (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).  It is widely agreed that someone who has property in a 
resource typically will have at least some right to exclude others from using or interfering 
with that resource.  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 730 (arguing that “the right to exclude oth-
ers is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua 
5
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On his general point, two observations are in order.  First, 
Kaiser Aetna presents a powerful challenge to Rehnquist’s general 
announcement because the fact pattern lies at an uncharted interface 
of the legal regimes for land and for water.  The problem arose when 
Kaiser Aetna made extensive improvements in its site that converted 
private “fast land” (land near the water but above the high water 
mark) into navigable waters.8  Current (and questionable) water law 
gives the United States a dominant easement over navigable waters 
that subject them to regulation without compensation.9  But, Justice 
Rehnquist applied the land based rules to these improvements be-
cause he was, at least implicitly, concerned with the unfortunate in-
centives against improving land that would be created if the comple-
tion of a marina resulted in the forfeiture of the improved site to the 
government under its navigation easement.10  In principle, this dis-
connect should not occur because the correct reading of the com-
merce power over navigable waters should not confuse, as in Twin 
City,11 the power to regulate with the ownership of the property, as 
the case law now does.12  But, it is only with fast stepping that the 
problem can be addressed within the current Supreme Court frame-
work, which mangles the relevant concepts. 
Second, even if confined to interests in land, the right to ex-
clude understates the robustness of common law property rights.  As 
articulated, this notion is so constrained that, standing alone, it does 
not allow for either the creation of divided interests in land, or for the 
development or use of property in either its unified or divided state.  
Indeed, read literally, the right to exclude does not even give the 
owner the right to enter into possession of his own land.  The more 
 
non”).  The proposition is plausible for land, but not for water where equal access without 
exclusion is the dominant trope. 
8 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 170. 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956) (“The in-
terest of the United States in the flow of a navigable stream originates in the Commerce 
Clause.  That Clause speaks in terms of power, not of property.  But the power is a dominant 
one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any competing or conflicting one.  The power 
is a privilege which we have called ‘a dominant servitude.’ ”). 
10 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79. 
11 350 U.S. 222 (1956). 
12 For the modern position, see United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 
(1945), and for the alternative position, see United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 330 (1917).  
For my defense of Cress, see Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property 
Rights in Land and Water, in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 317, 343-48 (Dan-
iel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012). 
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robust system of property rights, covering both use and disposition, is 
organized in a way to make sure that once the resource is given to 
somebody, that single person can now control its future destiny and 
enter into transactions with other people by way of sale, lease, mort-
gage and gift of complete or partial interests.  This is no arbitrary as-
semblage of rights, so, once again, the disconnect between public and 
private law undermines the coherence and efficacy of the former. 
By the same token, the legal universe of property rights does 
not consist solely of these voluntary transactions.  The overall system 
of rules also has to deal with the negative externalities between 
neighbors, covered by the law of nuisance, which at the very least 
deals with pollution in all sizes and shapes, for which remedies by 
way of damages and injunctions, alone or in combination were criti-
cal.13  It is not that the law held that there was no room for pollution.  
But, if someone wanted to pollute the land of another, the appropriate 
way to do so was to purchase the requisite easement, and not to take 
it unilaterally, and without compensation.  The strong law of tort 
helped force people to enter into voluntary transactions for mutual 
gain with their neighbors.  At this juncture, the central mission of the 
system of property rights is to lower transaction costs through devices 
such as deeds and recordation which in turn increase the possibility 
of gainful transactions. 
It is important to note some of the key features that give this 
system of property rights in land its internal strength.14  First, it is 
perfectly scalable.  The major obligation that the world owes to land-
owners is to forbear from entering their property or from committing 
common law nuisances.  These negative commands work as well in a 
small society of a thousand individuals as they do in a complex socie-
ty with millions of individuals, because their content does not vary as 
the number of parties increase or decrease.  No matter who is born, or 
who dies, the set of obligations remains constant over time and across 
locations. 
A second reason why the system works well is that its basic 
rules are wealth independent.  The system works as well in poor soci-
eties as in rich societies, and the basic content of the rules does not 
change as the overall levels of wealth vary.  There are, therefore, no 
 
13 For my account, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Util-
itarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 92, 97 (1979). 
14 For a further discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011). 
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awkward transitions when changed circumstances require a shift in 
rules.  This feature is powerful with land, but it does not work nearly 
as well with water, which starts out as a common resource.  In those 
cases, the interdependence of the fluid resource means that greater 
risks of negative external effects arise from the more intensive use of 
water rights.  It follows, therefore, that a simple rule that allows any 
party to keep the water it extracts from its land will work well when 
use levels are not intensive.15  But, that system of absolute rights 
must yield to some system of correlative rights and duties when use 
levels become more intense, which is why some system of first pos-
session gives way to some system of reasonable use or correlative 
rights.16  But, even here, it is only the intensity of use, and not the 
levels of wealth that drive the transformation of the legal regime.  
But, no matter how the argument is sliced, water law rules are more 
complex than those for land.  All of this, however, does not mean that 
takings protection should be as negligible as is provided to water law.  
It only means that the state law baselines against which the property 
rights are generally defined will vary with the variations among par-
ticular water rights systems, so that prior appropriation states (with 
their own variations) have one set of entitlements, and riparian and 
reasonable user states will have yet another. 
The third feature about these rules of property is that they 
make it easy for the owner of land to give notice to the world as to 
what is required of them.  There is an old legal axiom that says, igno-
rance of the law is no excuse, which is often subject to moral reserva-
tions on the ground that it is difficult for parties to know the law and 
to conform their conduct to it.17  But, the simplicity and universality 
of the forbearance regime makes any such objection ring hollow in 
the property context, where that rule makes perfectly good sense.  
The basic norm of noninterference by use of force is so powerful un-
 
15 Acton v. Blundell, [1843] 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.); see also Chasemore v. Richards, 
[1859] 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (H.L.). 
16 See, e.g., Meeker v. City of E. Orange, 74 A. 379 (N.J. 1909) (noting the reasons for the 
transition); see also Sipriano v. Great Springs Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999) 
(noting the changes in Texas law from the earlier rule in Houston & Texas Cent. Ry. Co. v. 
East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904), which itself recognized key exceptions dealing with mali-
cious acts of withdrawal and subsidence claim).  On the former, see Richard A. Epstein, 
Property Rights, State of Nature Theory, and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 1 (2009); on the latter, see Epstein, supra note 12. 
17 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (providing that failure of an out-
of-state to register as a “convicted person” not punishable under the Due Process Clause 
against a new arrival to the state who had no knowledge of the law). 
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der all of these circumstances that it would be pointless to require in-
dividual landowners to give specific notice to every other individual 
about the content of the norm.  They know its content because they 
have been socialized into a legal environment which has always un-
derstood and respected those laws.  The issues that are left concern 
the mixture of remedies between damages and injunctive relief, 
which always coexist in uneasy proportions.  But, these rules have 
two key functions.  The obvious one is to provide compensation and 
protection when the rules of the game have been breached.  The less 
obvious, but perhaps greater, role is to reduce the probability of 
breach in the first instance.  The situation with water is not all that 
different at least with respect to pollution, for the outsider need not 
know how water rights are configured to realize that some claimant at 
least has a claim with respect to the damages in question.18  So, it is 
no surprise that once the basic protection is established, the choice 
between damages and injunctions follows closely on the heels of the 
rules for land.19 
III. THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM 
The previous section has argued for the internal coherence of 
the basic common law system both for land and for water.  One of 
these strengths is that when all the rights and duties are put together, 
a coherent system of property rights helps allow for the emergence of 
a competitive system with land, with free transferability of assets.  
That level of efficiency cannot be achieved with water given the dif-
ficulties in organizing any system for the transfer of rights that does 
not create risk for other holders of water rights in the same river, lake 
or stream.  But, even if these common law rules are honed to perfec-
tion, they give rise to certain difficulties from which voluntary trans-
actions do not offer any easy line of escape.  It is from these issues 
that the law of takings is born. 
To one illustration, consider the downside of a legal regime 
that awards the ownership of a wild animal to its first possessor.20  
That rule has a huge advantage insofar as it identifies the one person 
 
18 Note, for example, the similarities in the strong protection given against pollution be-
tween Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 58 N.E. 142, 147 (N.Y. 1900) (regarding a reasonable user), 
and Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 55 (1913) (regarding a prior appropria-
tion). 
19 See, e.g., Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927). 
20 E.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
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who is now entitled to decide whether the animal should be slaugh-
tered, be used to pull a plow, or to breed.  No legal system could 
work if all animals were perpetually held in common, at which point 
the endless succession of possible vetoes would prevent any one per-
son from making rational decisions with respect to its use.  Yet, by 
the same token, when the intensity of fishing and hunting increases, 
the same weakness that overwhelms simple regimes of water rights 
emerges, namely a serious problem with common rules over the fish-
ing and over hunting.  Since there are huge gains that can be obtained 
by stopping excessive depletion of these natural stocks, how ought 
this transformation of rights be done best?  Removing individual 
rights to fish or hunt counts, in my view, as a loss of property rights, 
albeit losses difficult to identify and to value given their differential 
rate of exploitation.  The question is what can be done to offset that 
loss.  In this instance, we know that gains are possible because of the 
larger stock that the conservation program yields.  It should therefore 
be possible to create limited hunting rights that function as an in-kind 
form of compensation for the losses involved.  These rights should, in 
the first instance, go only to those who have previously made use of 
the common pool resource.  Its exact amount is uncertain, as is the 
best mode of allocation for any additional gain that is produced by 
the compensation scheme.  The burden of the restriction is offset by 
the limited access rights to a large pool.  As in so many cases, the 
takings law does have a key compensation component, not in cash, 
but in-kind. 
There are also other situations where a key holdout problem 
can be met with in-kind compensation, as in the construction of roads 
and railroads, which are vulnerable to holdouts by any landowner 
along the way.  What the takings power does is eliminate the risk that 
the road can be snipped in a dozen places.  The landowner gets the 
full value of the land, without regard to the road, and shares pro rata 
in the overall improvement once that road is in place.  The just com-
pensation requirement ensures that the individual, who has been 
forced by law to contribute property to some common improvement, 
is not wiped out in the process.  The just compensation requirement 
assures that the state’s option to compensation can never be exercised 
at zero price, but only at fair market value.  Done correctly, no one 
gets hurt, and any social improvement remains.  The strong system of 
property rights coupled with a robust eminent domain splits the dif-
ference between the wipeout, on the one hand, and the holdout on the 
10
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other. Any disconnect between public and private law disappears. 
IV. CRACKS IN THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
TAKINGS 
This view of property rights, consistently applied to constitu-
tional law, sharply limits the permissible activities of government.  In 
particular, these constitutional constraints call into question grand 
schemes of social planning that do not focus on these two warring 
forces.  If the rules that I have outlined lead to systematic improve-
ments in overall social welfare, any deviation from them will have 
untoward social results, as the new discretion conferred on govern-
ment agents will do more harm than good.  Indeed, that is just how 
modern takings law plays out both with land and water. 
So, let me pick a few examples to show how this dynamic 
plays out in connection with the line from Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co.,21 to Armstrong v. United States,22 Penn Central to Yee v. 
City of Escondido,23 where the disconnects between public and pri-
vate law are deep and profound. 
A. Euclid 
Euclid involved land use restrictions that the Village of Eu-
clid, located adjacent to Cleveland, Ohio, imposed on a sixty-eight 
acre parcel located conveniently between two railroads, which its 
owner had decided to devote to industrial use.24  Since the plot was 
both large and regular in shape, the standard common law issues of 
nuisance did not arise because the plant was located relatively far 
from any boundary line, so little or no pollution-like externalities 
could arise.25  The law of nuisance played no role in that place and, 
hence, there was no reason to decide between damage remedies and 
injunctive relief.  Indeed, it is the prospect of injunctive relief, once 
the factory is up and running, that doubtless induced owners to locate 
and design its facilities from the ground up to avoid a potentially dis-
astrous confrontation with a neighbor.  Shutting down a factory in 
 
21 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
22 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
23 503 U.S. 519 (1992). 
24 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379, 384. 
25 Id. at 387-88. 
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operation is always a major step with serious consequences.  By 
backing off from the boundary, the landowner obtains a margin of 
safety that allows for continuous operations.  The common rules ex-
ert, therefore, a useful indirect pressure to guide the path to success-
ful land development. 
Government planners, however, are rarely content to allow 
private parties to make development decisions within the confines of 
the nuisance law, but have a more capacious view of their own role.  
So, in Euclid, the planners designated this sixty-eight acre plot for 
residential use, for apartment houses, multi-family homes, sewage 
disposal and other services.26  Dividing the plot up in that that fashion 
robs it of any internal coherence, cutting its value dramatically, per-
haps by as much as eighty-five to ninety-percent.27 
The constitutional question was whether these restrictions 
constituted a taking even though Ambler Realty remained in posses-
sion of the plot throughout.28  The Supreme Court, speaking through 
Justice George Sutherland, a Harding appointment and former U.S. 
Senator from Utah, held that this ordinance was legitimate govern-
ment regulation under a capacious account of the police power that, 
at the very least, involved an elastic notion of nuisance.29  Justice 
Sutherland wrote: 
Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid 
the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a 
particular use, like the question whether a particular 
thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an ab-
stract consideration of the building or of the thing con-
sidered apart, but by considering it in connection with 
the circumstances and the locality.  A nuisance may be 
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in 
the parlor instead of the barnyard.30 
Once again, he mangles the law.  Euclid does not put the pig 
into the parlor.  Nor does the great case of Sturges v. Bridgman31 
support Sutherland’s odd view of the law of nuisance.  That case in-
 
26 Id. at 380-82. 
27 Id. at 384. 
28 Id. 
29 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397. 
30 Id. at 388 (citing Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852, 865 (App. Cas.)). 
31 [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852 (App. Cas.). 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 2, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/6
2014] COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS  277 
volved the sophisticated response that Jessel, M.R. had to the coming 
to the nuisance defense, in a situation where the defendant druggist 
had used property in ways that created noise that crossed the bounda-
ry line to the plaintiff’s property such that it did no harm until the 
plaintiff set up, as he was allowed to do, a medical examining room 
on his premises.32  Jessel, M.R. held that the action was allowed, and 
gave the defendant some time to relocate his facilities.33  In essence, 
he imposed this sophisticated deal on the parties: the statute of limita-
tions was tolled until the actual conflict arose, allowing the defendant 
intermediate use of the facility.34  However, that case bears no rela-
tion to this one, where there was no nuisance activity of any sort that 
could give rise to the accommodations needed in coming to the nui-
sance cases. 
Once again, there is a disconnect between the private law case 
cited and the broad conclusion that Sutherland reached: 
There is no serious difference of opinion in re-
spect of the validity of laws and regulations fixing the 
height of buildings within reasonable limits, the char-
acter of materials and methods of construction, and the 
adjoining area which must be left open, in order to 
minimize the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of 
over-crowding and the like, and excluding from resi-
dential sections offensive trades, industries and struc-
tures likely to create nuisances.35 
Still, at no point did he indicate the precise evil to which this ordi-
nance was directed when the factual pattern of development negated 
all such risks. 
Now look at this case against the background of the basic 
common law rules, where the disconnect is apparent.  Let’s suppose 
two people own neighboring plots of land.  The first person comes 
along and says that he thinks it is completely inappropriate for the 
neighbor to build a factory on his large plot of land, notwithstanding 
the fact that there is no common law nuisance.  In the law of nui-
sance, the timing of remedy is ever so critical, and the ordinance in 
Euclid is, to coin a phrase, “too much too soon.”  If governed by 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. 
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common law rules, the City would seek an injunction, but it would 
not be granted until there is an actual or imminent physical invasion 
of his own property.  But, unfortunately, when the case moves from 
the court room to the council room, the rules of the game change, 
such that the right to block the new factory can be ordered by admin-
istrative decree, which now transforms property rights so that no one 
person can build unless they obtain the blessing of their neighbors 
through a political process in which their minority interest is overrun.  
That political process, thus, enshrines a broad holdout right of the 
type that both the private law and the eminent domain power are both 
intended to overcome.  The great danger is that the redefinition of 
nuisance can grind development to a halt.  The neighbor that has a 
specific grievance may always obtain, but for a price, a restrictive 
covenant to stop the activities.  So, if a group of neighbors want to 
stop the development, they cannot circumvent their duty to compen-
sate by having a majority of the zoning board do their bidding.  The 
opportunities to game the system should be apparent. 
Typically, of course, restrictive covenants against future con-
struction are not created between neighbors with preexisting hold-
ings.  But, it is very common to include detailed covenants in planned 
unit developments where each individual owner derives title from a 
common owner.  The reciprocal covenants in a properly designed 
plan will enhance value overall.  However, it is one thing for a com-
mon owner to impose those particular covenants on the owner of a 
particular unit; it is another thing for any one person, by his own 
power, to assert a covenant against anybody else.  The disconnect is 
total.  The key point to remember, therefore, is that every zoning law 
amounts to an effort by some members of the community to impose 
restrictive covenants on others, without having to pay for the change.  
These restrictive covenants (like various easements over the property 
of another) are property interests that the government takes from 
some people, which it then gives to others.  In some cases, the bur-
dens and benefits may be reciprocal at which point they may cancel 
out.  But, in Euclid, the benefits from these go only to a select group 
of outsiders, which means that to a common lawyer the entire scheme 
amounts to the taking of a fractional interest in property, whether by 
easement or covenant, for which compensation is then required. 
Using the power of regulation in this fashion has powerful po-
litical and economic ramifications.  Any decision to just let the regu-
lations go forward without constitutional resistance will leave all oth-
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er citizens largely indifferent to the large decline in property values 
suffered by the owner.  But, once the imposition of these land use re-
strictions become compensable, citizens’ attention will now perk up 
because the restrictions appear as a liability on the government’s 
books, which in turn creates an imperative for local government to 
either raise taxes or lower other types of expenditure.  What seemed 
to be a free good now becomes a costly one. 
But, is it one that it is worth the community to buy?  We 
know at the outset that the burden of proof is on those who want to 
make this heavy expenditure to justify it.  To make that determina-
tion, the local government has to sum up all of the positive and nega-
tive externalities, and conclude that the positive gains exceed the as-
sociated losses by an amount equal to the decline in the property 
value of the subject plot, plus the administrative costs needed to put 
the restrictions in place.  Unless this condition is satisfied, supporters 
of the plan will not be able to forge a winning coalition.  But, in most 
cases, in fact, the gains to the winners are likely to be far smaller than 
the losers.  More concretely, it should not be forgotten that large in-
dustrial properties also generate positive social consequences by sup-
plying job and business opportunities in the region, and complemen-
tary resources, like housing for workers, may also increase in value 
as well.  It is likely, therefore, that restrictions of this sort would be 
voted down if the government were forced to pay.  But, that is exact-
ly the right result for projects that have a net negative present value. 
In many ways, the current situation gets even more complex if 
it turns out that the original owner had chosen the right intended use 
for its site, which might not be useful for the mix of uses contemplat-
ed in the master plan.  Indeed, in Euclid, the new ordinance spurred a 
ten-year period of protracted negotiations, which resulted in a return 
to the original zoning that allowed that initial plan to be put in 
place,36 but only after exacting various kinds of cash or other conces-
sion from the owner as the price for the restoration of the status quo 
ante.  Normally, bargaining is good because it moves resources to 
their higher value uses.  But, in this instance, the prospect of obtain-
ing the exaction has the unfortunate effect of increasing the severity 
of the initial zoning restrictions, in order to acquire by fiat something 
that can later be resold to its original owner.  Kidnapping is a similar 
process.  This extra two-step imposes renegotiation costs, which only 
 
36 Id. at 386-87. 
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delay the project.  Linear development is now replaced by this intri-
cate dance that only destroys wealth and diminishes opportunity.  
This is not a sensible game plan. 
B. Armstrong 
In cases like Euclid, the requirement of just compensation has 
the same effect as a price system in ordinary markets.  It works to 
forestall this downward cycle by acting as a vital counterweight to 
the power to take or regulate.  So, once it is disciplined by a price 
system, the behaviors of local governments are completely trans-
formed for the better by clipping the wings of government.  That in-
sight is captured in the instructive case of Armstrong v. United States 
whose closing sentence reads: “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee 
that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”37  In that case, the public 
law followed the private law and there was no disconnect.  The plain-
tiff was a subcontractor for the government and he placed, as local 
law allowed him to do, a “materialman’s” lien on the boat to recover 
his costs.38  The government dissolved the lien by sailing the ship out 
of Maine waters.39  The decision represented the view that the “mate-
rialman” should not be required to bear the brunt of the expenditures 
needed to fix a ship that was in the service of the entire public. 
Under that logic, Euclid could not survive in the absence of 
any explanation as to why the rural character of the Village, if desired 
by others in town, should be paid for in full by the Ambler Realty 
Company.  If there really are profound indirect benefits to the Village 
of Euclid, all the more reason that it should pay for it.40  And, the 
touted environmental benefits are just cheap talk to conceal some of 
the parochial motives of those who benefit from this covenant; the 
just compensation requirement will smoke them out. 
 
37 Id. at 49. 
38 Id. at 41. 
39 Id. 
40 See, e.g., id. at 48. 
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C. Penn Central 
This exact logic of Armstrong carries over to Penn Central, 
which is probably the most important contemporary regulatory tak-
ings case.  The Penn Central Company operated Grand Central Rail-
road Terminal in a way that permitted it to cover its costs.41  The 
company then sold the air rights over the terminal for the construc-
tion of a Breuer Tower, whose construction would change the view 
up and down Park Avenue.42  The common law rule with respect to 
views has always been clear: the only way to protect against the loss 
of view is to purchase a covenant over the subject property.  To use 
any other rule leads to this untenable state of affairs.  If an existing 
owner can block the construction on a nearby site, it creates a huge 
rush to be the first to construct in order to create that advantage.  Yet, 
at the same time, the first to build can be met with an objection by the 
owner of a vacant lot that his development is not allowed because it 
prevents the second party from building in an orderly fashion.  In es-
sence, there can be no temporal priority in this situation, so that the 
choices are clear: either both parties can build (in whatever order they 
like), or neither party can build.  Clearly, the gains from the latter po-
sition are far larger, and the clear delineation of property rights al-
lows either party to purchase some covenant that restricts (but need 
not eliminate) construction on a nearby site.  The initial construction 
of a building, therefore, is yet another illustration of an economic 
harm that does not give rise to a legally cognizable claim. 
The decision in Penn Central illustrates the high cost of the 
private/public disconnect when it allowed the government to take the 
air rights without paying for them.  When Justice Brennan, in Penn 
Central, announces that landmark preservation statutes that, among 
other things, prevent the construction of additions to existing land-
marks are needed to preserve “civic pride in the beauty and noble ac-
complishments of the past,” or to promote tourism, he is referring to 
benefits that exist for all citizens of New York, not just Penn Cen-
tral.43  He has established a public use for the taking, but has not ex-
cused the imposition of those restrictions without just compensation.  
The decision, with respect to the air rights in Penn Central, is thus on 
all fours with the decision in Armstrong on materialmen’s liens.  Oth-
 
41 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115. 
42 Id. at 116-17. 
43 Id. at 109. 
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erwise, however, New York City may overcome the holdout problem, 
although it cannot wipe out Penn Central’s air rights without com-
pensation. 
In this particular case, there were two ways to look at the 
facts.  In fact, the decision in the New York State Court of Appeals 
by Judge Charles Breitel did not treat this as a taking of air rights, but 
as a rate regulation case.44  His attitude on rate regulation was that the 
reasonable return that the City had to supply for imposing this re-
striction did not start with the current fair market value of the proper-
ty.45  Instead, the City was entitled to subtract out of this nominal rate 
base, any contribution to its value from the benefits that it received 
from other structures in the neighborhood and from the public infra-
structure.46  So, the owner of a fancy townhouse on Madison Avenue 
worth a million dollars does not receive the full value when it is con-
demned, given the contributions that his neighbors and the City are 
said to have made to the property.47  But, does anyone really believe 
that the condemnation could be done for a fraction of market value, 
say, $400,000?48  The disconnect between private and public systems 
of valuation could not be more apparent. 
Breitel’s strained reasoning ignores the fact that every proper-
ty owner has already paid for these other amenities through his real 
estate taxes or through the benefits that his house confers on others, 
or has paid full value to a prior owner who has made just those pay-
ments.  Once the property owner has already paid for his particular 
share, the correct rule is that the government can take, but only if it 
pays the same amount that any private party would have to pay to ac-
quire the property in the voluntary market. 
At this Supreme Court level, Breitel’s novel theory disap-
peared without a trace, so that what started as a rate regulation case 
became a case for the taking of air rights.49  These air rights may be 
mortgaged; they may be sold; they may be developed in one form or 
another with the acquisition of a suitable support easement.  So, the 
correct way to treat Penn Central is to let the government buy those 
air rights at fair valuation for the public purposes of protecting civic 
 
44 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1273-75 (N.Y. 1977). 
45 Id. at 1273. 
46 Id. at 1278. 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., id. 
49 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130. 
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pride and promoting tourism. 
Of course, Justice Brennan did not do that.50  But, what he did 
was wreck the common law of property by refusing to recognize the 
huge gains from trade that come from the division of the fee simple 
into its constituent parts.  Rather, he insists, without any justification, 
that the evaluation be of the “the parcel as a whole,” such that so long 
as there is a viable economic use of the site in its current configura-
tion, the payment for the entire loss of development rights is zero.51  
By mangling the law of land for the benefit of the government, it en-
courages the over-acquisition of air rights found in any regime that 
lets government force the sale of private property for zero price.52 
None of this is consistent with Armstrong given that materi-
almen’s liens and air rights are both partial interests in property, 
which were taken in different ways for the benefit of the community 
at large.  The proper course, therefore, is for the City to condemn the 
air space before any construction takes place and to pay for what it 
takes.53  Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, said that this is a spot zon-
ing case,54 and objected to singling out this site for special treatment.  
He has half a point here—if it turns out that these restrictions are re-
ciprocal among multiple landowners, and the height restriction on 
others could supply full compensation to each owner, as a form of in-
kind compensation.55  But, don’t bet on this to be true in fact.  It is al-
so possible that there is limited reciprocity, so that the various re-
strictions provide partial offset for the losses—at which point the cor-
rect response is to use cash compensation to make up the difference.  
Penn Central was, of course, a single action, so that any claim of re-
turn benefit is chimerical.56 
The reason why the case is so important is that it enshrines the 
disconnect between private and public law as sacred doctrine.  Justice 
Brennan only got to this strange result by demoting partial interests in 
property rights into some non-compensable form of expectation.57  
Why?  Because he said that the loss of these particular rights is no 
 
50 Id. at 138. 
51 Id. at 130-31. 
52 Id. at 137-38. 
53 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48. 
54 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 140. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 130 (majority opinion). 
19
Epstein: Common Law Foundations
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
284 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
different from the decline in value of property by virtue of competi-
tion from somebody else in the marketplace.58  Now, that asserted 
parity, between a restrictive covenant and a competitive loss, is the 
most fundamental error that can be made on a common law topic.  It 
represents an indefensible equation of two kinds of situations that are, 
in fact, polar opposites of each other.  Competition is a positive sum 
game that maximizes social utility.  Done without compensation, 
zoning laws are a negative sum game that destroy social utility.  
None of this is softened by the claim—dubious on the facts of this 
case—that different rules apply to regulatory and physical takings.59  
But, that position only enshrines the disconnect.  Under both the Ro-
man law of servitudes and its modern re-articulation, covenants and 
easements are treated as part of a single whole, as stressed by Susan 
French, who led the Restatement efforts on this subject.60  Penn Cen-
tral is such a fiasco because an important Justice on the Supreme 
Court does not know the first thing about private property rights, and 
thus blithely turns the key components of the system upside down by 
refusing to understand or apply the rules on divided interests in land 
to government action.  The disconnect lives. 
Now, in one sense, the Court in Penn Central had an easy out 
because the site was already developed so that the decision did not 
impair the solvency of the firm.61  To be sure, that is never the correct 
standard in takings cases, where the proper measure is the difference 
in value between the property without the restriction and the property 
when subject to the restriction.  But, whatever the normative weak-
ness of the insolvency line,62 the practical implications of Penn Cen-
tral hits home once some land use restriction keep the property in a 
form where its use cannot cover its expenses or mortgage debt.  The 
same problem also arises when the restrictive covenants against the 
construction of new properties render the site virtually worthless.  So, 
 
58 Id. at 136-37. 
59 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (2000); see also Susan French, Perpetual 
Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future, UCLA PUB. L. & LEGAL 
RES. PAPER SERIES, at 4 (2005); Susan French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Re-
weaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982). 
61 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 134-35. 
62 See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1180 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The contention that no company that is not clearly headed for bankruptcy 
has a judicially enforceable right to have its financial status considered when its rates are 
determined must be rejected.”). 
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rather than facing the wipe out problem directly, the law takes this ra-
ther dubious turn which says that so long as the owner is left with 
some “viable economic use” it does not matter if the regulation wipes 
out the rest of its value.  But, if the regulation does wipe out all eco-
nomic uses, then the government must compensate the landowner in 
full.  What that payoff structure does, in effect, is invite local gov-
ernments to play the following kind of game: How much value can it 
wipe out at zero cost to ourselves before it sets off that magic tripwire 
that forces it to pay full compensation? 
So, just where does that discontinuity lie and why?  There is 
no answer of any sort, as of yet, from the Supreme Court in the now 
thirty-six years since Penn Central came down.  Nor is it possible to 
think of where to introduce the needed discontinuity to make this 
two-tier system operate.  Indeed, I am hard-pressed to think of any 
level of diminution in value through government regulation that trig-
gers a serious constitutional inquiry, given that competitive losses 
never do (and never should) trigger that examination.  Any systemat-
ic embrace of that position makes the flaccid reading of the Takings 
Clause a great destroyer of private value because governments now 
have a license to regulate with impunity so long as ten-percent of the 
original value remains, even if it appears that the dollars in question 
are not sufficient to service any debt on the property. 
D. Yee 
Regrettably, this frame of mind carries over to yet another tru-
ly misguided eminent domain case, which Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor wrote for a unanimous court in Yee v. City of Escondido.63  
To see why, recall that Justice O’Connor’s perspective on constitu-
tional law is born in large measure by her role as a state legislator in 
Arizona.64  She is, therefore, very comfortable with state regulatory 
systems that impose limitations on private parties, so she tends to 
back off high levels of constitutional scrutiny in property cases.65  
But, when the discussion turns federalism, as a state legislator she 
became keenly aware of the heavy-handed commands that the federal 
 
63 Yee, 503 U.S. at 519. 
64 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Decisions of Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor: When Pragmatic Balancing is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. 
RIGHTS CONF. J. 177 (2012). 
65 See generally id. 
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government frequently imposes on the states.66  Her federalism opin-
ions are uniformly excellent because she stays away from rational ba-
sis and tries to work through conflicting claims on first principle.  
Her property opinions are often weak (at least until her dissent in Ke-
lo v. City of New London)67 because of her unthinking deference to 
local governments.68 
This last frame of mind matters in Yee.  Consistent with the 
basic theme, the common law of property takes a very clear position 
that the destruction of a reversion, when the time comes for it to fall 
into possession, is a taking of that interest.69  In principle, property 
can be divided by time as well as by space, and a loss of control over 
either dimension is a taking to the extent of any economic loss in 
property value.70  The unquestioned legal ability to create short-term 
leases increases the gains from trade, which explains the ubiquity of 
leases in unregulated markets.  The transition at the expiration of 
term can give rise to delicate transitional problems, which is why 
well-negotiated leases in cases with major investation lavish great 
care on renewal and termination principles that often give the option 
to one side to buy out the interest of the other, or to sell out to that 
party.  All of these provisions are intended to prevent opportunism by 
either side from removing some of the gain from the transaction.  The 
whole point of these provisions is to protect the respective contribu-
tions of both parties to the lease arrangement from confiscation from 
the other. 
In ordinary lease situations, of course, the common law de-
velops default rules to fill in the gaps on termination of the lease, 
which are relatively easy to apply to residential tenants who do not 
make many site-specific investments.  The standard common law rule 
lets the landlord treat the holdover tenant (i.e. the tenant who stays on 
at the termination of the lease without the approval of the landlord) in 
one of two ways.  Either the landlord can obtain summary eviction to 
recover the premises, with some interim rental thrown in for good 
measure,71 or, alternatively, the landlord can require the tenant to pay 
 
66 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-68 (1992). 
67 545 U.S. 469, 494-505 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
68 Yee, 503 U.S. at 538-39. 
69 Acceptance Ins. Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
70 Yee, 503 U.S. at 538-39. 
71 See, e.g., Crechale & Polles, Inc. v. Smith, 295 So. 2d 275, 277-79 (Miss. 1974). 
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the rent on a month-to-month lease.72  The point of this remedial sys-
tem is to make sure that the tenant who is in the wrong does not gain 
any negotiating advantage from the landlord.  That regime has the 
salutary effect of reducing dramatically the frequency of holdover 
cases.  Now, the rent control law takes all the high cards from the 
landlord and gives them to the tenant.  Thus, in Block v. Hirsh,73 a 
decision in 1921 by Justice Holmes, the plight of the tenant was giv-
en priority over the common law rules in the housing shortage in 
Washington D.C. in the wake of the surge of public officials to the 
City.74  Holmes did not so much as address the distinction between 
physical and regulatory takings—a holdover tenant is surely an occu-
pant whose possession is backed by the long arm of the state—but 
solely the short term-emergency that he thought engulfed the capi-
tal.75  But, that conception of emergency is easy to abuse if the gov-
ernment that imposes rent control is allowed to define its occurrence 
and extent.  Thus, New York City is still under a de facto perpetual 
state of local emergency under its tortured definition of an emergency 
that makes no reference to floods, hurricanes or power outages.  In-
stead, the law defines an emergency as a vacancy rate of under five-
percent, which is always met because the artificially low rents give 
tenants every reason to stay in their current premises.76  It brings no 
honor or intellectual distinction to the federal and state judges who 
accept this threadbare definitional ploy as a way to prop up a rent 
control regime that introduces massive and well-nigh permanent dis-
tortions into real estate markets. 
This basic disconnect at issue was successful in one of the 
run-up cases to Yee, the important 1986 California decision in Hall v. 
Santa Barbara.77  As is always the case with rent control laws, the 
more valuable the property, the greater the spread between the market 
and the regulated rents, and the more entrenched the tenants—always 
local voters—in their determination to keep the system in play.  
There is, to be sure, a physical difference between the New York sit-
uation, and the California situations in Hall and Yee.  In the former, 
 
72 Id. at 277. 
73 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
74 Id. at 153-54. 
75 Id. at 154-55. 
76 See, e.g., Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 246 (1922); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 26, §§ 26-501-26-520 (2013). 
77 883 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding perpetual leases under rent control law in Santa 
Barbara were not takings, but justified by emergency absent war or flood). 
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the tenant keeps possession of the apartment.78  In the latter, the ten-
ant keeps possession of a recreational vehicle that sits on top of the 
land.79  Only a legal hairsplitter could think that this distinction 
should impact the question of whether at the expiration of the lease 
the landlord may remove the tenant from the land.80  The common 
law rules did not tolerate any such distinction, but took the position 
that any increment in the value of the land during the pendency of the 
lease belonged to the tenant, but belonged to the landlord thereafter.  
The rent control law gave the tenant a free option to renew the lease 
at the previous rental rate.  He could keep the full increment if the 
value of the property increased, but he could vacate the property or 
renegotiate a rent reduction if it went down.  Heads-I-win, tails-you-
lose. 
The question is whether the constitutional analysis requires 
any different result under a law that draws the unwise distinction be-
tween regulatory and possessory takings.81  Under the Loretto line of 
cases,82 it appears to me that any person who permanently parks his 
RV on someone else’s property has permanently taken possession of 
it.  So Justice O’Connor, understanding that point, sidestepped the 
Loretto rule in the rent control context by insisting rent control in-
volves not a possession of property, but a mere use of the property.83  
Thereafter, she mangles the doctrine of estates by announcing that 
since the landlord let the tenant voluntarily into the premises, the ten-
ant may now stay perpetually.  Again, note the disconnect: at com-
mon law, the temporal dimension of property counts for every bit as 
much as the spatial dimension, so that the correct answer is that the 
tenant is entitled to stay only for the duration of the term, after which 
he must leave.84  It does not do for Justice O’Connor to focus her at-
tention on one-half the lease arrangement while ignoring the other.85  
 
78 Id. at 1276. 
79 Yee, 503 U.S. at 523; Hall, 883 F.2d at 1273. 
80 Hall, 883 F.2d at 1274. 
81 Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (March 1, 2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/physic 
al-regulatory-takings. 
82 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Yee, 503 U.S. at 
531-32; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1988); Hall, 883 F.2d at 1270. 
83 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 527 (“The government effects a physical taking only where it re-
quires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land.”). 
84 Id. at 527-28. 
85 Id. at 528. 
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One might as well say that a borrower on a loan for one year at five-
percent is unilaterally entitled to extend that note in perpetuity at 
five-percent even if the interest rate doubles. 
Justice O’Connor then compounds her initial error by noting 
that the landlord still has some residual possibility of prying the ten-
ant out from the space but only if he commits to tearing down the 
property which then must remain useless until zoning and building 
permits are issued in the same community that enforces the zoning 
restrictions.86  The value of that cluster of phantom rights is as close 
to zero as any one may imagine, which is why the tear-down option 
has never been exercised in the history of Santa Barbara.87  It is, 
moreover, no wonder that a broken down RV worth, say $2,000, can 
sell for a small fortune.88  The new buyer is just paying the sitting 
tenant the present discounted value of the rental savings, which in 
principle belongs to the landlord.89  This redistribution of wealth is 
not harmless, for it distorts the incentives to upgrade properties and 
of course gives tenants the powerful incentive to vote for the continu-
ation of the current set of restrictions. 
V. INJUNCTIONS VERSUS PERMITS 
Thus far, I have done my best to demolish any new constitu-
tional law of property rights that differs systematically from the 
common law rules.  But, the issues involved here extend not only to 
the question of property rights, but to the choice of remedies.  If these 
are effectively stifled, the delay will in effect work a partial taking of 
the property, just as the refusal to pay the current interest coupons of 
a bond work a taking, even if years down the road the principal is re-
paid.  It is not surprising, therefore, that courts work over time to 
weaken remedial protection in order to strengthen the planning arm 
of the state.  Therefore, it is critical to expose the disconnect between 
the common law approach to injunctions and the constitutional ap-
proach to state permits.90  The former, that there is a likelihood of 
imminent or actual harm, you can stop a particular activity from tak-
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Yee, 503 U.S. at 527. 
89 Id. 
90 Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407 
(1995). 
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ing place,91 where the class of actionable harms is narrowly defined 
to cover the standard nuisance case.  No landowner could ever get an 
injunction against the construction of a new house on the grounds 
that it blocks the view of the water.  For that, the proper remedy is to 
purchase the covenant. 
Yet, the set of expectations is transformed in three key ways 
when the government seeks to exercise its permit powers.  First, the 
definition of pollution or other cognizable harms is expanded so that 
pollution includes the reflection of light off a glass house onto the 
ocean.92  That broad definition is a convenient fig leaf designed to 
prevent development by locals who want to keep population densities 
down by denying neighbors the right to develop their own land.  Sec-
ond, the new process goes on forever, so that development is halted 
in the interim, which amounts to a system of takings by titles.  Third, 
permits come in swarms.  Some are local, some state, some national.  
The sequencing problems are enormous because often permit A may 
not issue until permit B is issued, so that the permit convoy is now 
held up by the speed of its slowest vessel.  Taken together, these var-
ious strategies suck the lifeblood out of many viable projects.  But, 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,93 the “normal” 
time for processing permits, which is not treated as a temporary tak-
ing, so expands, that the obligation to compensate for temporary tak-
ings never quite crystallizes.94  Once again, the time value of land use 
is excluded from the compensation equation. 
VI. CONDITIONAL APPROVALS 
The expansion of time allows the state to delay matters further 
by allowing a building permit only if certain conditions are satis-
fied.95  The broader the range of conditions, the greater the power of 
abuse.  In my view, there is only one Supreme Court case that took 
 
91 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
92 Laguna Beach Citizens for Responsible Coastal Dev. v. City of Laguna Beach, No. 
G035601, 2006 WL 1493790, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2006). 
93 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
94 See id. at 321 (“We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal 
with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining 
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before 
us.”). 
95 Aptos Seascape Corp. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 197 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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the right approach, which is Dolan v. City of Tigard,96 penned by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.  His position identified two legitimate sets 
of conditions that could be attached to permits.97  The first allows the 
state to enjoin new activities so that they do not result in the commis-
sion of a common law tort like flooding neighboring lands.98  Thus, it 
is permissible to prohibit the use of hard surfaces whose effect is to 
increase water flow onto someone else’s property where it will cause 
mischief, which brings to mind the general rule in Rylands v. Fletch-
er99 that attaches strict liability to someone 
who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and col-
lects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if 
it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does 
not do so, is primâ facie answerable for all the damage 
which is the natural consequence of its escape.100 
The second situation arises when the government supplies an indi-
vidual with some return benefit, such as the removal of flood waters 
from his own land.  At that point it is appropriate to charge for that 
service.101  Unfortunately, most of the exaction cases involve neither 
threatened harm or a return benefit.  Typically, as in the recent case 
of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,102 the exac-
tion demanded has nothing to do with either harms prevented or ben-
efits conferred.  Instead, government restrictions are imposed on a 
party who wants to develop a valuable parcel of land that local gov-
ernment would prefer to keep as a wetland,103 without having to pur-
chase either the plot or some of its development rights.104  At this 
point, the familiar disconnect repeats itself.  Unless the expenditure 
goes on budget, the local government faces no price constraint that 
might lead it to moderate its demands.  But, requiring compensation 
eliminates the endless games that arise whenever the state insists that 
its conditions are not all that onerous, which the landowner then vig-
orously denies.  So, in Koontz, state planners wanted Koontz to give 
 
96 512 U.S. at 374. 
97 Id. at 385. 
98 Id. 
99 Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R.E. & I. App. 1 (H.L.). 
100 Id. at 3; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87. 
101 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-95. 
102 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
103 Id. at 2592. 
104 Id. 
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them money to fix a road or a ditch somewhere else, or make some 
specific acquisitions of property somewhere else, in order to get his 
permit.105 
This holdup game is intuitively understood as a form of high-
way robbery.  But, there is a technical way to sharpen that intuition as 
to why these conditions should never be allowed.  The purpose of an 
eminent domain law is to take that property and to move it into public 
control where we have some degree of confidence that its value in 
public hands is greater than its value in private hands.  Only in that 
fashion is there a social gain that justifies the use of state coercion, as 
there often is with the assembly of land to build a railroad or high-
way.  But, in order to condemn only in the proper case, the state actu-
ally has to make the right comparison—how much is the land going 
to cost it, and what benefit will the state derive.  That process works 
well when the state puts cash on the barrelhead, but it does far worse 
when the state is allowed to add conditions to the mix, as by holding 
a building permit worth thousands of dollars hostage to an easement 
to cross land worth only a fraction of that amount, which is what 
happened with the lateral easement that the California Coastal Com-
mission wanted to bundle with a building permit in Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission.106  The landowner who compares what is 
lost and what is gained will typically capitulate.  But, the entire pro-
cess is defective because it allows the state to avoid the one compari-
son that should be made, namely whether or not the easement is 
worth more to the government than it’s worth to the private party.  It 
is only if the state is required to pay for the easement it wants, will 
there be an accurate valuation.  On this view, if the takings option is 
foreclosed, then general social improvements should be funded from 
general revenues, which gets to the right result. 
One way to avoid this result is to insist that there is an envi-
ronmental easement over all properties so that all developers must 
take care to mitigate the harm that their development causes.107  But, 
that novel argument is yet another version of the disconnect between 
private and public law, by allowing the government to now veto de-
velopment unless it gets compensation for its broad definition of 
harm.108  This mitigation obligation is properly understood as a re-
 
105 Id. at 2592-93. 
106 483 U.S. at 825. 
107 Aptos Seascape Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 201. 
108 Id. 
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strictive covenant that the government wants to impose on this land.  
And, if it wants it, it should pay for it.  When a court gives it to the 
state, it is replicating the error in Euclid.  Under the common law, no 
such easement exists, so that the state has to condemn in all cases, 
which is the right result, because putting matters on budget is far 
more efficient socially than bundling goods and bads together in un-
predictable ways that create more heat and little public transparency.  
Nothing in this approach prevents the state from stopping the con-
struction of homes that will topple to the ground, as if that were the 
goal of landowners.  The common law rules were efficient.  The 
modern state variants are not. 
VII. A CODA ON WATER RIGHTS 
As promised at the outset, I shall end with a few remarks on 
water rights, which illustrate the same point.  As mentioned earlier, 
no system of water rights can have exactly the same efficiency as a 
system of property rights in land.109  But, in many cases through cus-
tomary evolution, water rights have fallen into some clear categories.  
One such issue involved the allocation of the rights to build mills 
along rivers to exploit the possibility for energy.  The common law 
system in this area adopted a norm of a reasonable user, which tried 
to maximize the twin norms of full participation and efficient use.110  
These two components are in obvious tension with each other, and 
often the common law rules had to be supplemented by statutory Mill 
Acts to make these allocations.  But, once made, it became clear that 
a lower riparian could not back up the waters so as to deprive an up-
per riparian of his rights. 
The question then arises as to how this system applies when 
the state wishes to alter the flow of water in a way that no private ri-
parian could do.  Justice Pitney in United States v. Cress111 resisted 
the temptation that seduced Justice Douglas in Twin City—noted 
above—to convert the grant of the commerce power into a property 
interest in the form of a dominant navigation easement, and thus re-
quired compensation.  His decision was effectively obliterated by a 
noted decision of Justice Robert Jackson in United States v. Willow 
 
109 For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Epstein, supra note 12. 
110 Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 424 (1874). 
111 243 U.S. at 316. 
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River,112 which again introduces the disconnect between public and 
private rights: 
[N]ot all economic interests are ‘property rights’; only 
those economic advantages are ‘rights’ which have the 
law back of them, and only when they are so recog-
nized may courts compel others to forbear from inter-
fering with them or to compensate for their invasion.  
The law long has recognized that the right of owner-
ship in land may carry with it a legal right to enjoy 
some benefits from adjacent waters.  But that a closed 
catalogue of abstract and absolute ‘property rights’ in 
water hovers over a given piece of shore land, good 
against all the world, is not in this day a permissible 
assumption.  We cannot start the process of decision 
by calling such a claim as we have here a ‘property 
right’; whether it is a property right is really the ques-
tion to be answered.113 
It is a dead tipoff in situations of this sort that the use of quo-
tation marks around key conceptions is the prelude to their distinc-
tion, which is what happens to “property rights” here.  At no point 
does Justice Jackson ask about the private rights between neighboring 
riparians.  Instead, he contents himself with the correct observation 
that property rights are not “absolute,” without understanding the im-
port of that statement.  These rights are not absolute because they 
may be condemned on payment of just compensation.  But, by stress-
ing the fatal disconnect, Justice Jackson concludes that they can be 
wiped out without just compensation because the rules that govern 
riparians have no role to play in the setting of the rules that govern 
the state.  At that point, of course, just what rules will apply?  In Twin 
City, this position was taken to its logical conclusion in a decision 
that denied the owner of the fast lands compensation for its loss of its 
site as a source of hydroelectric power, which of course was protect-
ed against private invasion.114  No matter: 
[i]t is no answer to say that these private owners had 
interests in the water that were recognized by state 
 
112 324 U.S. at 499. 
113 Id. at 502-03. 
114 Twin City, 350 U.S. at 228. 
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law.  We deal here with the federal domain, an area 
which Congress can completely preempt, leaving no 
vested private claims that constitute ‘private property’ 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.115 
The private rights are gone.  Private property now receives its own 
special meaning.  Nor is it just a coincidence that the nominalism on 
private property rights that infects Justice Jackson’s decision has mi-
grated from water to land in, appropriately enough, Penn Central, in 
which Justice Brennan relied on Willow River to support the proposi-
tion that there are the “decisions in which this Court has dismissed 
‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the challenged govern-
ment action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests 
that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of 
the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purpos-
es.”116  So again, there is the disconnect: what is property for one 
purpose is not property for another purpose.  There is no reason to be-
labor at length that once this disconnect is introduced, the protections 
of the Fifth Amendment are effectively eviscerated in a large number 
of cases.  The losses from that decision are not just those sustained by 
the individual landowner.  They also include the social costs to eve-
ryone that follow from the substitution of an inefficient system of le-
gal protections for the superior common law rules.  The disconnect 
comes at a high cost, and so long as it remains the takings law will 
always be a muddle. 
 
 
115 Id. at 227. 
116 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
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